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PROHIBITING PYRAMID SALES SCHEMES: COUNTY, STATE
AND FEDERAL APPROACHES TO A PERSISTENT PROBLEM*
INTRODUCTION
The resilient pyramid sales scheme' continues to be one of the
most effective means of defrauding the unsuspecting consuming public.
Both New York State and Erie County, New York, have recently
enacted legislation purportedly designed to exterminate this ubiqui-
tous pest. This Comment will attempt to analyze these two anti-
pyramid plan statutes, and will try to demonstrate that both suffer
from serious definitional and remedial difficulties. It will go on to
suggest a more efficacious means of regulating pyramid schemes
through the use of the federal securities laws. Both the Securities Act
of 1933 and rule lOb-5, promulgated under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, will be thoroughly examined in order to unveil the
largely untapped potential of federal securities regulations to effici-
ently eradicate these schemes.
To familiarize the reader with some of the prosecutorial problems
frequently encountered in an action brought against an alleged pyra-
mid plan, this Comment will explore the County of Erie's initial
attempt to enjoin, under the authority of the recently enacted county
statute, a purported pyramid promotion.2 The particular business
* This Comment has its origin in a paper jointly prepared by the author and Judith
K. Sinclair for a course in Consumer Protection Systems, spring, 1974.
1. "The common element of the various forms of pyramid promotions is a sales
pitch which stresses the amount of money a participant can make on the recruitment
of others to participate in the plan." Applicability of the Securities Laws to Multi-
level Distributorship and Pyramid Sales Plans, SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release
No. 5211, SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 9387 (Nov. 30, 1971)
(hereinafter cited as SEC Release). Inevitably the scheme also entails the sale by par-
ticipants of some product or service. However, the most lucrative aspect of the plan
is the commissions a participant receives for inducing others to join the scheme. As
more and more individuals invest in the plan, the available source of additional pro-
spective participants rapidly diminishes, and thus the chances for participants to earn
the promised commissions become progressively smaller. This self-limiting feature is
found in virtually all pyramid schemes although it is never disclosed to participants.
For a more detailed description of the two most prominent types of schemes, the
multi-level distributorship and the founder-membership plan, see SEC Release; Comment,
Pyramid Schemes: Dare to be Regulated, 61 GEo. L.J. 1257 (1973); Comment, Pyra-
mid Scheme Regulation, 25 SAcus. L. Rxv. 690 (1974).
2. County of Erie v. Golden Book of Values, Inc., Index No. E-713 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Erie County, Aug. 22, 1974).
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proposal under attack in the County's suit will be described and
analyzed at length. This business operation will then serve as a use-
ful tool in delineating the perimeters of both of the New York en-
actments. Indeed, it will be shown that this alleged plan seems to fall
outside the proscription of both the Erie County and New York State
statutes.
I. THE BIG-GBI PLAN
A. A Description of the Plan
An investment promotion offered jointly by Golden Book, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as GBI), and the Bull Investment Group
(hereinafter referred to as BIG) was the subject matter of the County
of Erie's first injunctive proceeding brought under the new County
law. GBI, a New Jersey corporation, is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of BIG, a New Hampshire corporation. As the County's Memorandum
on Behalf of Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as Brief for Plaintiff)
pointed out, promoters of BIG, which is allegedly "a sales and man-
agement company which markets franchises on behalf of Golden
Book, Inc.," 3 conduct opportunity meetings at which prospective in-
vestors are encouraged to become dealers for GBI for a consideration
of $2,500. Having invested the required $2,500, a dealer for GBI
is entitled to develop the "Golden Book" concept in a geographical
area to which he has been assigned. In plaintiff's affidavit of Michael
Etgar, Assistant Professor in Marketing and Operational Analysis at
the State University of New York at Buffalo, it is represented that
GBI's Operating Manual restricts the number of dealers in a given
geographical area so as to ensure a ratio of one dealer per 10,000
population.4
The Golden Book concept is founded on the notion of providing
local merchants with inexpensive, but efficient advertising. The Brief
for Plaintiff described the basics of this advertising program as fol-
lows: 5 Dealers in a given geographical area seek out merchants within
3. Brief for Plaintiff at 7, County of Erie v. Golden Book of Values, Inc., Index
No. E-713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Aug. 22, 1974) (hereinafter cited as Brief
for Plaintiff).
4. Affidavit of Michael Etgar for Plaintiff at 3, County of Erie v. Golden Book
of Values, Inc., Index No. E-713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Erie County, Aug. 22, 1974) (here-
inafter cited as Affidavit for Plaintiff).
5. Brief for Plaintiff at 7-9.
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the area who are willing to buy advertisements in a yet-to-be pub-
lished Golden Book of Values. Each advertisement costs $195. Once
115 advertisements have been sold to businesses located in a given
area, GBI publishes a completed Golden Book for that locale. Dealers
then attempt to sell the book, together with a "value card," to local
residents. A value card costs the consumer $15 and entitles him to
take advantage of the discounts offered by each merchant who bought
an advertisement in the Golden Book of Values.6
A final, important aspect of this promotion is that a prospective
investor can also become an "Independent Sales Agent" for BIG. An
Independent Sales Agent is granted the "privilege" by BIG of selling
dealerships in GBI for a commission. BIG claims that this "privilege"
is granted separate and apart from any investment an individual might
make in a GBI dealership. The BIG-GBI program is presented by
BIG at the opportunity meetings. The Brief for Plaintiff noted that
the Golden Book "Operating Manual sets forth a prescribed sales
speech which is required to be given verbatim to prospective in-
vestors"7 at these meetings.
The Brief for Plaintiff also detailed three major ways (as they
are explained by BIG's sales presentation) in which an investor can
make money through the BIG-GBI program. 8 The first way is to
become an Independent Sales Agent for BIG. An Independent Sales
Agent is entitled to a $900 commission for each individual he con-
vinces to invest the requisite $2,500 in a GBI dealership. It is repre-
sented at the opportunity meeting that an Independent Sales Agent
can sell two dealerships per month so that at the end of one year,
an Agent can expect to have secured $21,600 in commissions.
The second way to earn money through BIG-GBI is to sell ad-
vertisements in the Golden Book of Values to local merchants. A
dealer is not permitted to sell such advertisements in his designated
area, however, until the required number of dealerships, as deter-
mined by BIG, are sold in that geographical area. Once the pre-
determined number of dealerships are sold in a given area, dealers
6. The advertising merchants themselves can also sell value cards to consumers.
Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id. at 7-9. The brief for plaintiff mentioned that the fourth and final way to
make money under the plan is through an override system. Id. at 9. The details of
this system, however, are not important for purposes of this analysis.
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assigned to that area are permitted to sell advertisements in a proposed
Golden Book for $195 each, from which the dealer selling the ad-
vertisement earns a 50 percent commission, or $97.50. Agents of BIG
claim that a dealer will be able to sell ten advertisements for a total
of $975 in commissions.
A third way to make money is through the sale of value cards.
As already indicated, once 115 advertisements are sold to merchants
in a given area, the Golden Book of Values for that area is published.
After publication, dealers can sell value cards and Golden Books to
residents of their designated area for $15 per card, from which the
dealer receives a commission of $12 if he made the sale directly, or
$8 if the card is sold by a merchant to whom the dealer sold an ad-
vertisement. It is represented at the opportunity meeting that a dealer
can sell 17 value cards per day for six months, a total of approximately
3,000 cards, and earn $24,000 in commissions.
B. The County's Attack
The County argued in its Brief that the totality of opportunities
to make money offered by the BIG-GBI plan is primarily contingent
upon the sale of dealerships rather than the sale of a product. This
condition arises because no advertisements, and therefore no Golden
Books and value cards, can be sold in a geographical area until all
the dealerships in that area are sold.9 The Brief stated that "it is
clear that defendants' operation not only in significant measure in-
volves selling the right to sell but, in fact, it is wholly and totally
dependent and contingent upon the sale of dealerships."' 0 More-
over, the Brief for Plaintiff indicated that the dealership agreement
which a dealer for GBI must sign expires at the end of one year.
Under the terms of the agreement, if a dealer has not sold the requi-
site number of advertisements or value cards by the end of the year,
his dealership is cancellable and his $2,500 investment nonrefund-
able. "Thus, if the requisite number of dealerships in the designated
area have not been sold the dealer will have been unable to sell any
ads or value cards, yet the [promoters] have reserved the right to
terminate the dealership for this 'deficiency.' "1k
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original).
11. Id. at 13.
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As already mentioned,12 it is represented at the opportunity
meeting that a dealer can recruit two new dealers each month and
thus earn $21,600 yearly in commissions (24 dealers multiplied by
$900 commission per dealer). The Brief for Plaintiff noted, however,
that based on the analysis of Professor Etgar "[i]f each investor were
to sell the number of dealerships which defendants claim he will be
able to, the number of dealerships available in Erie County would
be exhausted within four months (thus making it impossible for an
investor to sell dealerships for a 12 month period as is repre-
sented) . . .. "113 In fact, Professor Etgar's affidavit pointed out that
were this method of recruiting to operate as claimed for 18 months, it
would require participation in the plan by more individuals than
presently populate the United States.14
12. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
13. Brief for Plaintiff at 12.
14.
Where the requirement of new dealers is discussed, the presentation proposes
that each new dealer can recruit at least two new dealers each month. This
is supposed to give the original dealer $21,600 in his first year of operaiion.
However, if one projects the figures as outlined in the presentation, their re-
cruitment of dealers is as follows:
Month New People Old People Total Enrolled
1 3 0 2
2 6 3 9
3 18 9 27
4 54 27 81
5 162 81 243
6 486 243 729
7 1458 729 2187
8 4374 2182 6561
9 13122 6561 19683
10 39366 19683 59079
11 118098 59049 177197
12 354294 177197 471441
13 942882 471441 1414322
14 2828646 1414323 4242969
15 8485938 4242969 12728907
16 25457814 12728907 38186721
17 76373442 38186721 114560163
18 229120326 114560163 343680489
These figures imply that in four months 81 dealers will be recruited-
more than the company claims that it will allow to operate in the Erie County
area. In eighteen months this method of recruiting will exceed the population
of the United States.
Affidavit for Plaintiff at 2.
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With reference to value cards, Professor Etgar, as previously
indicated, 15 stated in his affidavit that the number of dealers appor-
tioned to a given geographical area is determined by BIG-GBI on
the basis of one dealer per 10,000 population. He further noted that
in Erie County, New York, where BIG-GBI initially established its
operations in Western New York, the size of an average household
is 3.40 people; therefore, the number of households allotted to each
dealer in Erie County is about 2,940. As a consequence, Professor
Etgar concluded that even if a GBI dealer were to sell a value card
to every household in his assigned geographical area within Erie
County, certainly a very unlikely event, he would not be able to
reach the promised figure of 3,000 value cards sold within six months.10
C. The Sum of the Statistics
Assuming that the County's statistical analysis is accurate, it would
appear that a dealer's actual opportunity to recoup his investment is
not as promising as the promoters of BIG-GBI represent. It seems
from the foregoing statistics that the sale of dealerships and of value
cards, as represented, logically require involvement in the plan of
more individuals than are likely to be interested in any given product
or service. The Erie County and New York State statutes were pre-
sumably intended to prohibit the operation of plans which entail such
mathematical impossibilities. As will be shown, however, neither
statute succeds in this task.
II. THE ERIE COUNTY STATUTE
A. Introduction
The legislature of Erie County, New York, on April 16, 1973,
enacted a statute prohibiting the operation of pyramid sales schemes.' 7
The legislature stated as a declaration of policy that: "It is contrary
to the interests of the People of Erie County to permit companies
which, for the purpose of defrauding the public, practice a pattern of
misrepresentation, trickery and deceit by operating what is termed
15. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
16. Affidavit for Plaintiff at 3.
17. County of Erie, N.Y., Local Law No. 10-1973, April 16, 1973 (hereinafter
cited as Local Law No. 10-1973).
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a 'pyramid sales scheme' or 'endless chain plan.' "18 In analyzing the
provisions of this statute, their application to the BIG-GBI promo-
tion will serve to accentuate the statute's strengths and weaknesses.
B. An Analysis of the Erie County Statute
The statutory definition of a pyramid sales scheme essentially
proscribes businesses which sell the right to recover one's investment
in the business primarily through the recruitment of others for the
business.' 9 In the BIG-GBI plan, however, it was made clear that the
right to recruit others for the plan was a "privilege" granted to In-
dependent Sales Agents of BIG, separate and apart from investing in
a GBI dealership. It is arguable, then, that the BIG-GBI plan does
not require the payment of consideration for the right to recruit
others. As a result, this plan is presumably not one which sells the
right to recover one's investment through the recruitment of others.
Even if it is assumed that during the plan's term of operation in Erie
County most Independent Sales Agents were also dealers, the County
would still be confronted with serious prosecutorial burdens. It would
be incumbent upon the County to prove that at least one person
was required to become a GBI dealer before he could become an
Independent Sales Agent, despite the promoters' claims to the contrary.
This proof problem is not easily overcome since it necessitates the
use of at least one investor in the plan as a witness. An investor is
often unwilling to testify either because he still believes in the worth
of the plan, is too embarrassed to testify, or is distrustful of the legal
process.
The statute provides three alternative remedies for the people
of Erie County with which to combat the pyramid sales scheme. First,
18. Id. § 1(a).
19.
The term "pyramid sales scheme" includes any plan or operation for the
sale or distribution of goods, services, or other property wherein a person for
a consideration acquires the opportunity to receive a pecuniary benefit (1)
which is not primarily contingent on the volume or quantity of goods, services,
or other properties sold or distributed or to be sold or distributed to persons
for purposes of resale to consumers, and (2) which is based upon the induce-
ment of additional persons, by himself or others, to participate in the same
plan or operation.
Id. § 2(d). This definition essentially proscribes businesses which sell the right to re-
cover one's investment through recruitment activities, because the definition conditions
participation in a scheme upon payment of a consideration.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
anyone selling, offering, or attempting to sell a participation in a
pyramid sales scheme is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a
fine of not more than $1,000, or a prison term of not more than one
year, or both.2 0 On its face, this first alternative seems to subject
GBI dealers as well as founders or promoters of the plan to criminal
sanctions. Unfortunately, most dealers have invested $2,500 in GBI
because they believe they have acquired a genuine business oppor-
tunity. When those same dealers sell, offer or attempt to sell a par-
ticipation in BIG-GBI, they continue to believe they are providing
an opportunity for others to make a worthwhile investment. These
trusting dealers, who have already each invested $2,500, are precisely
the individuals the statute is designed to protect, not prosecute. For
prosecutorial purposes, how does one distinguish between innocent
dealers and the supposedly guilty founders of a plan? The statute
provides no criteria for aiding in this process, thus leaving the ques-
tion of whom to prosecute entirely to the unfettered discretion of the
prosecutor. Yet, it is clearly important to prosecute only those who are
consciously perpetrating a fraud on the people of Erie County. The
County certainly does not want to punish those who have been de-
frauded, rather than those who are doing the defrauding.
However, the all-encompassing nature of the criminal provision
of the statute does offer certain prosecutorial advantages as well. The
fact that all dealers seem to fall within the proscription of the criminal
section can be used by the District Attorney's office as a bargaining
tool in encouraging various dealers to testify on behalf of the County.
A successful criminal prosecution, in turn, would presumably have
a res judicata effect upon any civil action brought by the County or
an individual. This effect would flow from the fact that plaintiff
must meet a more rigorous standard of proof in a criminal prosecu-
tion than in a civil action. Any defendant found to have violated the
County statute beyond a reasonable doubt must also be deemed liable
by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil action brought under
20.
Whoever sells or offers or attempts to sell a participation or the right
to participate in a pyramid sales scheme shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, as defined in Section 10.00 of the Penal Law of the State of New
York, and subject to a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for a
term not to exceed up to one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Id. § 3.
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the statute. One serious obstacle to a criminal action, however, is that
the court may decide to establish proof of scienter as a prerequisite
to any criminal conviction. Indeed, the court may choose to carry
over such a proof requirement to a civil action brought by the County.
A demonstration of guilty knowledge on the part of the promoters
of a scheme does not, on its face, seem to be an overly burdensome
task, but nonetheless it is an additional proof problem that a success-
ful action would have to overcome. 21
A second remedy provided by the statute is that contracts made
in violation of section three are void, and anyone who induces another
person to participate in a scheme is liable to that individual for twice
the amount of the required investment plus any necessary court costs. 22
Once again, the difficulty with this statutory language is that it seems
to make both innocent and guilty participants in a plan civilly liable.
Subjecting a dealer for GBI, who has probably not totally recouped
his $2,500 investment, to an additional payment of $5,000 in damages
seems patently unfair. The statute provides no help in determining
who should be held civilly liable.
If the statute is construed to hold only the two corporations
(BIG and GBI) responsible for damages, one immediately encounters
the prospect that the corporate assets may be minimal as a result of
distribution of corporate earnings to shareholders in the form of
21. However, in New York State three statutes which are frequently used to com-
bat consumer fraud, N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972) and N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAw §§ 349, 352 (McKinney 1968), do not require proof of scienter in a civil action
brought by the attorney-general. In addition, the statutes are afforded parallel con-
struction. See State v. Colorado State College of the Church of the Inner Power, Inc.,
76 Misc. 2d 50, 346 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1973); State v. Interstate Tractor Trailer
Training, Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 678, 321 N.Y.S. 2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1971). Moreover, even
statutes such as N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-g (McKinney 1968) and N.Y. PENAL
LAW% § 190.20 (McKinney 1967), which prescribe criminal penalties for certain
fraudulent activities, do not require the state to prove guilty knowledge on the part
of defendant. On the other hand, rule 10b-5, the pervasive and liberally construed anti-
fraud regulation promulgated under the Securities Act of 1934, does entail a scienter
prerequisite for a private action. See, e.g., Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). A scienter requirement, then, is at least a possibility.
22.
Any contract made in violation of Section 3 of this Act is void and any
person who induces another person to participate in a pyramid sale scheme
shall be liable to the induced person in an amount equal to the sum of (1) twice
the amount of consideration paid; and (2) in the case of any successful action
to enforce such liability, the costs of the action, together with reasonable at-
torneys fees, as determined by the court.
Local Law No. 10-1973, § 4.
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salary or dividends. If the corporations have insufficient funds to pay
for civil damages, then the problem becomes one of "piercing the
corporate veil" in order to reach the assets of the shareholders of
the two corporations. Ordinarily, piercing the corporate veil is not
easy under New York law. In fact, the New York Court of Appeals
has ruled that "[t]he law permits the incorporation of a business for
the very purpose of escaping personal liability." However, corporate
principals will be held directly liable in order to "prevent fraud or
to achieve equity." 24 Presumably, a successful prosecution of a pyra-
mid plan under the Erie County statute might lead a court to hold
the shareholders, officers and directors of such a corporate plan in-
dividually responsible.
The third remedial provision grants the County Attorney the
power to obtain a temporary restraining order or a preliminary or
permanent injunction to prevent the operation or attempted opera-
tion of a pyramid sales scheme in Erie County.2 It is well-settled,
however, that in order to obtain even a preliminary injunction, the
state must collect evidence and cooperative witnesses sufficient to
demonstrate probable success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable harm should the injunction not be granted.20 The difficulty
in procuring cooperative witnesses has already been demonstrated.
Indeed, by the time sufficient evidence is collected to obtain a pre-
liminary injunction, much harm may have already befallen the local
residents, and the scheme may have packed its bags and moved else-
where. New York State Attorney General Lefkowitz has noted "that
23. Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832,
833 (1955).
24. International Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 297 N.Y.
285, 292, 79 N.E.2d 249, 252 (1948). For a recent restatement of the "corporate veil"
doctrine as it exists in New York law, see Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223
N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
25.
Whenever it appears any person is engaged or is about to engage in any
or practice which constitutes a pyramid sale scheme, the Erie County Attorney
may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin such act
or practice, and upon a proper showing, a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary or permanent injunction shall be granted without bond.
Local Law No. 10-1973, § 5.
26. Metropolitan Transp. Authority v. Village of Tuckahoe, 67 Misc. 2d 895,
900-01, 325 N.Y.S.2d 718, 723 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 570 (2d
Dep't 1971).
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in 1970 his office investigated the activities of Koscot Interplanetary
and Dare to be Great, [two well-known pyramid schemes] ... but by
the time court action barring their activities had been completed on
December 1, [1970,] 1,604 persons in the state had invested more
than $3.8-million. '27 He further stated "that during the court pro-
ceedings, more than a dozen similar get-rich-quick companies started
operations in the state. '28
As already indicated, in a civil action ultimately designed to result
in a permanent injunction, the Erie County Attorney's office, on
August 22, 1974, did, in, fact, apply to the Supreme Court for the
County of Erie for a preliminary injunction in accordance with the
provisions of Local Law 10-1973, to temporarily enjoin the activities
of BIG and GBI.29 The County attempted to demonstrate that the
BIG-GBI promotion was a "pyramid sales scheme" within the mean-
ing of section 2 (d) of the ordinance. The court received a number
of affidavits from both plaintiff and defendants. Some of plaintiff's
affidavits were from persons who were disenchanted with the plan,
while some of defendants 'affidavits were from individuals who wished
"to capitalize on their investment by participating in the business of
the defendants."30 In determining whether a preliminary injunction
was warranted, the court endorsed the test that: "Preliminary injunc-
tions should be granted, if granted at all, with great caution and
only when required by imperative, urgent or grave necessity, or upon
clearest evidence, as where the undisputed facts are such that with-
out the injunction order a trial would be futile." 31 In applying this
test and denying the application for a preliminary injunction, the
court stated:
The views taken by either side are so widely divergent that it is
impossible for the court, on papers, to determine which side repre-
sents the cause of goodness and light and which side represents
avarice and rascality, if indeed there are any such black and white
postures to ever be uncovered. Nonetheless, only a trial with all of
the benefits of examination and cross examination of witnesses will
27. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1974, at 37, col. 3.
28. Id.
29. County of Erie v. Golden Book of Values, Inc., Index No. E-713 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Erie County, Aug. 22, 1974).
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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reveal what enterprises are being carried out and what causes are
being served and whether the statute itself is valid or is being
violated.8
The County of Erie has not pursued its prosecution of BIG and GBI.88
In summary, the statute contains several deficiences. The defini-
tion of pyramid sales scheme set forth in the statute is not sufficiently
sophisticated to entrap more intricate plans which do not make the
right to recruit contingent upon the payment of a consideration.
Moreover, its remedial provisions are neither expedient nor easily
enforceable. Perhaps the statute's greatest fault is that it is bound to
operate after the fact, that is, after some, if not much, harm has
already been inflicted upon consumers. This state of affairs may be
contrasted to that which exists under the federal securities laws which
are theoretically designed, through their registration procedures, to
prevent fraud before it happens. New York State has recently enacted
a statute similar to the Erie County law. As a consequence, the state
legislation suffers from many of the same defects.
III. THE NEW YoRK STATE STATUTE
A. An Analysis of its Definition of a Pyramid Sales Scheme
As of September 1, 1974, under the New York General Business
Law it is "illegal and prohibited for any person, partnership, corpora-
tion, trust or association or any agent or employee thereof, to promote,
offer or grant participation in a chain distributor scheme." 4 The
statute defines a "chain distributor scheme" as a "sales device" which
essentially sells the right to sell dealerships.85 As already demon-
32. Id. at 3-4.
33. Interview with Bruce Goldstein, Assistant County Attorney for the County
of Erie, in Buffalo, N.Y., Jan. 23, 1975.
34. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-fff(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
35.
As used herein a "chain distributor scheme" is a sales device whereby a per-
son, upon condition that he make an investment, is granted a license or right
to solicit or recruit for profit or economic gain one or more additional per-
sons who are also granted such license or right upon condition of making an
investment and may further perpetuate the chain of persons who are granted
such license or right upon such condition.
Id. § 359-fff(2).
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strated in reference to the Erie County statute,36 such a definition is
not sufficiently comprehensive to include a plan like that of BIG-GBI.
BIG does not "sell the right to sell dealerships" in GBI, but rather
allegedly grants Independent Sales Agents the "privilege" of recruiting
additional participants for the scheme. The net result of the BIG-
GBI plan is, however, rapid market saturation of dealerships, which
is presumably the primary evil the New York statute is attempting
to prevent. Nonetheless, the plan is apparently immune from the
sanctions of the New York statute. Only if the state can surmount
the serious obstacles entailed in proving that an individual must first
become a GBI dealer before receiving the privilege of becoming an
Independent Sales Agent, is a successful prosecution possible under
the new law.
Also, this statute, like the Erie County statute, apparently con-
demns the activities of dealers as well as promoters of the scheme.
The statute states that it is illegal for any person to promote partici-
pation in a chain distributor scheme.37 Surely the state legislators did
not intend to prosecute dealers for GBI who invested $2,500 and
made good faith efforts to recoup their investments. Rather the likely
intent of the legislators was to proscribe the activities of promoters
of such a plan who receive large sums of money in exchange for
initially (and probably perpetually) worthless dealerships. The statute
is silent on what criteria a prosecutor is to use to distinguish the in-
nocent participants from the culpable promoters of a scheme,
The second section of the statute provides that: "A limitation
as to the number of persons who may participate ... does not change
the identity of the scheme as a chain distributor scheme."38 Most
current schemes do not allow unlimited geometrical pyramiding of
dealerships to take place. Rather, these schemes place some arbitrary
restriction on the number of dealerships sold within a given geo-
graphical region. Such restrictions simply serve to slow down, but not
eliminate, the market saturation process. The second provision merely
ensures that schemes which do employ geographical restrictions will
not fall beyond the purview of the statute.
The final provision of the New York statute indicates that "[a]
36. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
37. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-fff(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
38. Id. § 359-fff(2).
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chain distributor scheme shall constitute a security within the mean-
ing of [General Business Law §§ 852 to 359-h]." 39 An analysis of the
securities regulations available in New York State is thus required.
B. New York State Securities Regulations
New York's "Blue Sky" provisions are embodied in article 23-A
of the General Business Law, also known as the Martin Act" 0 The
first section of the Martin Act essentially provides that: "Whenever
it shall appear to the attorney-general, either upon complaint or
otherwise .. . that any person, partnership, corporation, company,
trust, or association, or any agent or employee thereof ... shall have
employed, or employs, or is about to employ any deception, misrepre-
sentation, concealment, suppression, fraud, false pretense or false
promise" in any securities transaction, he may institute a pervasive
investigation of such a practice.41 The statute gives the attorney-
general broad subpoena powers to aid in such an investigatory
process. 42 Upon the collection of evidence satisfactory to him, the at-
torney-general may then bring an action to enjoin any such fraudulent
practice.43 Moreover, "[i]n any action brought by the attorney-general
. . . the court at any stage of the proceedings may appoint a receiver
of any and all property derived by the defendant or defendants or
any of them by means of any such fraudulent practices .. .,44
In defining the term "fraudulent practice" the New York Court
of Appeals has stated:
The purpose of the law is to prevent all kinds of fraud in connection
with the sale of securities and commodities and to defeat all unsub-
stantial and visionary schemes in relation thereto whereby the public
is fraudulently exploited. The words "fraud" and "fraudulent prac-
tice" in this connection should, therefore, be given a wide meaning
so as to include all acts, although not originating in any actual evil
design or contrivance to perpetuate fraud or injury upon others,
which do by their tendency to deceive or mislead the purchasing
public come within the purpose of the law.45
39. Id. § 359-fff(3).
40. Id. § 352-59-h (McKinney 1968).
41. Id. § 352(1).
42. Id. § 352(2).
43. Id. § 353.
44. Id. § 353-a.
45. People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 39, 154 N.E. 655, 657 (1926).
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Apparently, then, good faith is not an issue under the statute.46 "All
acts tending to deceive or mislead the public, whether or not the
product of scienter or intent to defraud, come within its umbrella." 47
The attorney-general, of course, is aided in his pursuit of fraudu-
lent securities practices by the registration provisions of the Martin
Act.48 Any dealer" or broker,5  prior to buying or selling any securi-
ties, must file a "broker-dealer statement" with the New York Depart-
ment of Law containing information pertaining to the business history
for the last five years, and the criminal record and educational back-
ground of the applicant and his or its officers, directors or other
principals.5 ' Also, any salesman,5 2 before buying or selling any securi-
ties, must file a "salesman's statement" containing the same informa-
tion as required from brokers or dealers in the "broker-dealer state-
ment. ' 53 The registration of brokers, dealers and salesmen is valid
for four years,54 and supplemental statements are periodically required
to keep information on file reasonably current. 55
In addition, "no dealer or broker shall sell or offer for sale to
or purchase from the public within or from this state . . . any securi-
ties issued or to be issued unless and until"5 6 a "state notice" is filed
with the New York Department of State containing his name and
address, the names of any partners if the broker or dealer is a partner-
ship, and the date of incorporation if the broker or dealer is a cor-
poration.57 Prior to the actual offer for sale or sale of any security, a
dealer must file a "further state notice" which identifies the security
46. People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 417, 419, 330 N.Y.S.2d 430,
432 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
47. Id.
48. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-e (McKinney 1968).
49. For purposes of this analysis, a "dealer" is a person or business "selling or
offering for sale from or to the public within or from this state securities issued by
it." Id. § 359-e(1) (a).
50. A "broker" is any person, or business "engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others within or from this state . .. .
Id. § 359-e(1)(b).
51. Id. § 359-e(3) (a).
52. This term is defined to include "every person employed by a broker or
dealer . . . for the purpose of representing such broker or dealer in the sale or purchase
of securities to or from this state."Id. § 359-e(1) (c).
53. Id. § 359-e(3)(b).
54. Id. § 359-e(3) (c).
55. Id. § 359-e(4).
56. Id. § 359-e(2).
57. Id.
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offered and gives the name, post office address and state of incorpora-
tion of the issuer.58 The primary exemption from these requirements
is a securities offering which is to be sold to not more than 40
persons. 9
One who engages in any fradulent securities practice is subject
to criminal penalties under the Martin Act. It is a misdemeanor to
employ:
(a) Any fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false pretense
or fictitious or pretended purchase or sale;
(b) Any promise or representation as to the future which is beyond
reasonable expectation or unwarranted by existing circumstances;
(c) Any representation or statement which is false, where the person
who made such representation or statement: (i) knew the truth;
or (ii) with reasonable effort could have known the truth; or
(iii) made no reasonable effort to ascertain the truth; or
(iv) did not have knowledge concerning the representation
made .... 60
Also, "any false statement of a material fact contained in any
broker-dealer or salesman's statement or supplemental statement"
is a violation of the Act. 61 A violation constitutes a misdemeanor and
entails a fine of not more than $500, or not more than one year im-
prisonment, or both.62 Finally, disobedience of an order or injunction
issued under the Act constitutes contempt of court resulting in a mis-
demeanor and fine of $3,000.63 Any repeated violation of an order
or injunction constitutes a felony resulting in a fine of $10,000, or
not more than four years imprisonment, or both. 4
C. A Critical Appraisal of the Martin Act
Despite the fact that the statute grants the attorney-general broad
investigatory powers, and despite the fact that the attorney-general,
in an action brought under the statute, does not have to prove all the
58. Id. § 359-e(8).
59. Id. § 359-f(2) (d).
60. Id. § 352-c(1)(a)-(c).
61. Id. § 359-e(6).
62. Id. § 359-g(2).
63. Id. § 359-g(1).
64. Id. § 359-g(3).
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elements commonly associated with a legal action for fraud,6 5 the
so-called "fraud" provisions of the statute are generally ineffective. An
action for fraud which consummates in the attorney-general securing
an injunction against the fraudulent practice, first requires that he,
by "complaint or otherwise" become aware of the practice. Then, he
must conduct a thorough investigation and an often lengthy court
proceeding. It has been argued already that in the context of pyramid
sales schemes, this time-consuming process may result in unrecom-
pensed, grievous harm to the consuming public.60
Even a cursory examination of the registration requirements
under the statute indicates that the information demanded is super-
ficial and inadequate.6 7 The disclosures required by the "broker-dealer
statement," "state notice" and "further state notice" do not provide
the attorney-general with information concerning the nature of the
business offering the securities, the purpose of the offering, the offer-
ing literature to be used, or the marketing plan for the securities.
Without such data, the attorney-general would be unable to identify
a pyramid sales scheme, should such a scheme choose to register with
the state. Another important defect in the registration process is that
[f]iling is a ministerial act and the Attorney-General cannot refuse
to file a properly filled out registration statement. The fact that the
Attorney-General does not have the power to act administratively to
suspend or revoke a registration hampers effective enforcement. His
recourse is to apply to the Supreme Court for an injunction [section
353], a slow and time consuming process.68
65.
Although the complaint sounds in fraud, many of the requirements of an
ordinary legal action for fraud need not be established by a plaintiff in an
action brought pursuant to the provisions of the Martin Act. In actions of this
type, for example, a plaintiff need not prove reliance by the purchasers of the
securities involved on the fraudulent representations, nor is it necessary for a
plaintiff to prove any element of damage. Likewise, an absence of scienter or
intent to defraud will not relieve a defendant from liability where the
purchasing public is actually being deceived and defrauded.
People v. Royal Sec. Corp., 5 Misc. 2d 907, 909, 165 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
66. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
67. Loss and Oowett have stated: "Once more we start with New York, because
its scheme of 'securities registration' is rudimentary-so much so that . .. New York is
customarily thought of as a 'fraud' state." L. Loss & E. Cow-TT, BLUE- SxY LAw
30 (1958).
68. Levy, Securities Regulation in New York, 35 N.Y.B.J. 256, 261 (1963).
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Even should a pyramid sales scheme comply with the provisions of
the new statute, the attorney-general, upon recognizing the existence
of the scheme, is still bound by the cumbersome process of applying
for an injunction. Moreover, a failure to file, or the "false statement
of any material fact" on a registration form results, at best, in a
minimal fine and misdemeanor conviction for the promoter of the
scheme. These remedies constitute little more than a slap on the wrist,
considering the substantial remunerative possibilities of a "successful"
pyramid plan.
A final, glaring weakness of the Martin Act is that it makes no
mention of whether or not a violation of the statute exposes the
violator to civil damages in a private action. It would seem that the
state legislators have left that interpretive task to the courts. The
case most widely cited for the proposition that failure to comply
with the provisions of the statute does not subject the guilty party
to civil penalties in a private action is Sajor v. Ampol, Inc.60 In that
case the court of appeals unaminously held that a failure to file a
"state notice" does not establish a ground for rescission and does not,
as the court below had ruled, render the securities sales contract
null and void. The Court added:
Our Legislature intended by the penal consequences to require all
dealers in securities to comply with the terms of the General Business
Law so that the state might have information whereby it could
proceed either criminally or civilly. It did not intend to make void
or voidable any and every contract made with a corporation dealer,
otherwise valid, simply because it had failed to comply with the
many administrative provisions of this law.70
The significance of the holding in this case is that it eliminated one
weapon in the defrauded securities purchasers' legal arsenal. Rather
than simply proving noncompliance with the registration require-
ments, a plaintiff, in order to obtain rescission or damages, would
have to demonstrate the four elements of fraud: material misrepre-
sentation, scienter, reliance, and consequent damage.
Since the Sajor decision, however, and particularly in recent years,
the trend in the courts has been to permit civil liability when non-
69. 275 N.Y. 125, 9 N.E.2d 803 (1937). See also Sheridan v. Weber, 252 App.
Div. 398, 299 N.Y.S. 726 (4th Dep't 1937).
70. 275 N.Y. at 131, 9 N.E.2d at 806.
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compliance is established. In a federal court case, Lupardo v. I.N.M.
Indus. Corp.,71 Judge Metzner of the Southern District of New York
refused to dismiss a private complaint which alleged a violation of
section 352-c of the New York General Business Law.72 Judge Metzner
cited Reitmeister v., Reitmeister7 3 in which the court stated:
Although the Act does not expressly create any civil liability, we can
see no reason why the situation is not within the doctrine which, in
the absence of contrary implications, construes a criminal statute,
enacted for the protection of a specified class, as creating a civil
right in members of the class, although the only express sanctions
are criminal.74
Judge Metzner then reasoned through the New York case of Atkin v.
Hill, Darlington & Grimm, 75 in which "the [first department] sustained
a right of action in rescission based on a violation of section 51 of
the Insurance Law,"76 to the conclusion that "if the New York courts
were presented with a civil action under section 352-c as here pre-
sented, they would adopt the reasoning in the Reitmeister case." 77
The reasoning of Judge Metzner was approved in another federal
case, American Bank & Trust Co. v. Barad Shaft Securities Corp.,78
in which, once more, a civil action for damages was founded upon
section 352-c of the New York General Business Law. In this case
the court emphasized that, "the New York courts do imply a civil
cause of action from a statute which endeavors 'to protect the public'
and where the only liability expressed in the statute is that of a
criminal offense. '79
At the state level, a case which recently ruled favorably on the
question of whether or not a private action for damages can be
founded upon a violation of the Martin Act is Barnes v. Peat, Mar-
wick, Mitchell 6 Co.8O The trial court denied defendant's motion to
71. 36 F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
72. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
73. 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (interpreting Communications Act of 1934,
§ 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)).
74. 162 F.2d at 694.
75. 15 App. Div. 2d 362, 224 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dep't 1962).
76. 36 F.R.D. at 439.
77. Id.
78. 335 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
79. Id. at 1282-83.
80. 69 Misc. 2d 1068, 332 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1972), stayed, 42 App. Div.
2d 15, 344 N.Y.S.2d 645 (lst Dep't 1973).
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dismiss plaintiff's third cause of action which alleged a violation of
section 352-c. In upholding plaintiff's right to bring this cause of
action, the court relied upon the Lupardo decision. However, there
were a number of federal actions pending against the same defendants
on the identical issues. As a result, the appellate division stayed the
proceedings pending the outcome of the federal actions. Therefore,
the ultimate result of the Barnes case is still undecided.
The Martin Act, then, is largely ineffective as a statutory device
to combat pyramid sales schemes. It does not provide mechanisms
by which enforcement officials may rapidly identify and expeditiously
prosecute such schemes. Most importantly, the statute provides no
civil damages remedy for the defrauded consumer. The courts may
be willing to imply such a remedy from the intent of the statute, but
the New York Court of Appeals has yet to reverse its unfavorable
position, taken in Sajor, on this question. The New York State legis-
lature, however, has not totally abandoned the consumer in the field
of securities regulation. It recently enacted the Intrastate Financing
Act which has important implications in the continuing fight against
the pyramid sales scheme.
D. The Intrastate Financing Act
In 1968 the state legislature added the "Intrastate Financing
Act" to Article 23-A of the General Business Law. This statute makes
it unlawful "to offer or sell any security which is part of an issue
offered and sold only to persons resident within this state unless an
offering prospectus which makes full and fair disclosure of all material
facts is first filed by the issuer of such security with the department
of law." 8' The prospectus is lawful for use 15 days after it has been
filed, unless prior to the expiration of this time the attorney-general
notifies the individual making the filing that the prospectus "fails to
make adequate disclosure."' 2 No offer or sale of a security can take
place unless, prior to or at the time of the offer or sale, the purchaser
has received a prospectus which has been approved under the act.88
Exempted from the provisions of the statute are those securities which
81. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-ff(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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are already registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 19334 or the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,85 or which have been exempted from
registration under the 1933 Act for any reason other than the intra-
state offering exemption.8 6
The appropriate contents of a prospectus have been thoroughly
detailed by the attorney-general through a set of rules and regulations.
He has established what should be included both on the cover" and
in the body 8 of an intrastate prospectus. Moreover, the attorney-
general has initiated a system of annual accounting reports which are
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa.
85. Id. §§ 78a-hh.
86. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-ff(5) (McKinney Sup. 1974).
87.
(2) There shall be set forth on the outside front cover page of every prospectus
the following:
(i) Name and address of the issuer.
(ii) Date of incorporation or organization of issuer and type of issuer entity.
(iii) Type of security being offered.
(iv) Price per unit and minimum and maximum unit that will be sold to any
individual purchaser.
(v) Total amount of offering.
(vi) Offering expenses.
(vii) Net proceeds to issuer.
(viii) Date of prospectus and date after which it may not be used.
(ix) The name and address of the principal distributor of the securities.
(x) A statement that "these securities are offered only to bona fide residents
of New York State."
N.Y.C.R.R., tit. 13, § 80.2(a) (2) (1968).
88. A skeletal outline of the suggested contents of the body of the prospectus
looks as follows:
(b) Body. The prospectus should be prepared in clear and simple language.
It should contain a table of contents and, where applicable, should contain
the information set forth below:
(1) Introductory Statement.
(2) Factors to be Considered by Prospective Purchasers.
(3) Profits of Promoters.
(4) Use of Proceeds of Offering.
(5) Capitalization.
(6) Descriptions of Business.
(7) Description of Property.
(8) Officers, Directors and Principals.
(9) Principal Holders of Securities.
(10) Description of Securities.
(11) Pending Legal Proceedings.
(12) Method of Offering.
(13) Annual Reports and Books and Records.
(14) Experts.
(15) Financial Statements.
(16) Other Material Information.
Id. § 80.2(b).
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required from all issuers of intrastate securities. Four months after
the close of each fiscal year, "all issuers which have made or were
requested to make a filing with the Department of Law pursuant to
the New York Intrastate Financing Act" must submit to the New
York Department of Law and to all persons currently owning the
securities of the issuer an annual report which contains: (1) a balance
sheet and a profit and loss statement for the fiscal year-which must
be accompanied by an opinion by an independent public accountant
as to the fairness of presentation of the issuer's financial position and
the results of operations reflected in the financial statements; (2) a
narrative report setting forth the material events of the preceding
year; (3) a statement indicating the use of proceeds obtained during
the year as a result of the offering of securities; (4) a statement re-
lating the names, home addresses, compensation, and other dealings
of all officers and directors of the issuer and whether or not any
principal, officer or director sold or otherwise disposed of or hy-
pothecated any of his securities.8 9
The added protections that this statute affords the consumer as com-
pared to the Martin Act are both numerous and important. Under this
statute the attorney-general has the option of rejecting a prospectus for
insufficient disclosure. It is reasonable to assume that many pyramid
sales schemes would have difficulty slipping through such a screening
process. If the promoters of a scheme contend that the prospectus has
been unreasonably disqualified, their remedy is to institute an Article
78 proceeding.9 0 Should a pyramid plan successfully register with the
New York Department of Law, each prospective investor in the plan
would at least have the opportunity to examine the same written in-
formation as did the state before deciding whether or not to become
a participant in the plan. Once a scheme has registered and begun
operations, both the department of law and all investors in the
scheme would be entitled to annual accounting reports which them-
selves may disclose the true nature of the plan.
Nonetheless, this act has a number of serious drawbacks. It
permits the delivery of a prospectus to the consumer at the same
time that an offer or sale of a security is being concluded. In the
89. Id. § 80.15(a)(1)-(4).
90. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1972); see Schumann v. 250Tenants Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 253, 256-57, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500, 504-05 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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context of pyramid schemes and their high-powered sales techniques,
the absence of time for the investor to examine the prospectus negates
the usefulness of its disclosure capabilities. Moreover, it is arguable
that the individuals who are likely to be drawn into a pyramid plan
are those who would have difficulty understanding the information
contained in a prospectus. Were this true, this state of affairs renders
the prospectus virtually useless. It must pointed out that potential in-
vestors in a pyramid scheme would receive a prospectus from the
promoters only if the promoters chose to comply with the require-
ments of the act, and only if the scheme somehow then escaped the
watchful eye of the professional staff of the department of law. Most
pyramid plan promoters, however, attempt to avoid any contact with
governmental authorities. Moreover, if the trained personnel of the
department of law failed to detect a pyramid plan from the dis-
closures in the prospectus, then it is unlikely that even the most
knowledgeable consumer would recognize the character of the plan
from the information contained in the prospectus.
As already intimated, most schemes attempt to evade the strictures
of the law. If a scheme does not accommodate itself to the New York
Intrastate Financing Act and its registration procedure, then the
consumers of New York fall prey again to the tedious process of com-
plaint, investigation, and application for injunction-the heart and
soul of article 23-A. The ineffectiveness of this process already has
been demonstrated. 91 Furthermore, the Intrastate Act like the Martin
Act has no civil liability provisions. And, finally, the Intrastate Act
is rendered totally inapplicable by simply offering or selling a par-
ticipation in a scheme to just one nonresident.92
New York State's "chain distributor scheme" statute is not the
only statutory device which the state and its residents can employ to
regulate and prosecute such schemes.93 However, the state legislators
91. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
92. Hochman, Intra-State Financing Act of 1968 and Other New York Blue Sky
Laws, 161 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1969).
93. Other statutory alternatives in New York State for the regulation of pyramid
plans include: N.Y. ExcE. LAw § 63(12) (McKinney 1968), which authorizes the at-
torney-general to institute an enforcement proceeding to enjoin any "repeated fraudu-
lent or illegal acts"; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 349 (McKinney Supp. 1974), which
authorizes the attorney-general to bring an action to enjoin "deceptive acts and prac-
tices"; and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(10) (McKinney 1967), which sets out the
elements of an unlawful lottery. For an application of the preceding statutes to fraudu-
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have apparently expressed their faith in the ability of securities regu-
lations to adequately protect the consuming public from pyramid
plans. An additional abundant source of securities regulation law
comes from the federal government in the form of the Securities Act
of 193394 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19349r
IV. THE SECURMES AND EXCHANGE COM IMISSION
A. The Applicability of Federal Securities Law to Pyramid Sales
Schemes
In any application of the federal securities law to pyramid
promotions, a threshold problem which has confronted the courts
is whether or not a pyramid plan falls within the definition of a
security.96 Two landmark Supreme Court cases which have sought to
demarcate the boundaries of the term "security" are SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp.97 and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.95 Joiner involved
the sale, by defendants, of assignments of oil leases. Defendants' sales
literature assured prospective buyers "that the Joiner Company was
engaged in and would complete the drilling of a test well so located
as to test the oil-producing possibilities of the offered leaseholds."'9
This promise was presumably defendants' prime selling point. De-
fendant in return hoped to finance the drilling of the test well solely
through the sale of the leaseholds. Indeed, the advertising literature
characterized the purchase of a leasehold interest "as an investment
lent sales schemes, see State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct.
1966); Note, Dare to be Great, Inc.: A Case Study of Pyramid Sales Plan Regulation,
33 OHIo ST. L.J. 676, 699-701 (1972).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa.
95. Id. §§ 78a-hh.
96. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain
very *imilar -definitions of a -"security," The 1933 Act definition reads as follows: "The
term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-tist certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as 'security', or any certificate of interest or participa-
tion in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." Id. § 77b (1).
97. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
98. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
99. 320 U.S. at 346.
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and as a participation in an enterprise."' 00 In holding that the sale of
assignments of oil leases constituted a securities offering, the Court
stated that
the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and common-
place. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear
to be, are also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they
were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing .
which established their character in commerce as "investment con-
tracts," or as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a
" 'security.' 
"101
Howey involved defendants' sale of units of a citrus grove de-
velopment. Prospective buyers were encouraged to sign both a land
sales contract and a service contract with defendants. Under the land
sales contract, a purchaser, upon payment in full, received a warranty
deed to a small plot in the development., The service contract gave
defendants "a leasehold interest and 'full and complete' possession"'0 2
of the buyer's acreage. For a fee' plus costs, defendants cultivated,
harvested, and marketed the buyer's crop. The 'buyer in turn was
guaranteed his share of the net profits after sale of the harvest from
the entire development. The Court in Howey found that the two
contracts taken together constituted an investmenf contract and, there-
fore, a security. In so holding, the Court emphasized that the defini-
tion of a security "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle,
one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profits."' 03 However, Howey is better known for its
elucidation of the test for what constitutes an "investment contract"
as that term is used in the Securities Act's definition of a security:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of a promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise. 04
100. Id. -
101. Id. at 351.
102. 328 U.S. at 296.
103. Id. at 299.
104. Id. at 298-99 (emphasis added).
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It is precisely this test which the courts have had to overcome in
order to bring pyramid sales schemes within the proscription of the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.
In a 1971 press release,105 the SEC stressed the "novel, uncommon,
or irregular devices" language in Joiner, and the "flexible rather than
static principle" language in Howey, in taking the position that pyra-
mid plans often involve "the offering of an 'investment contract'
or a 'participation in a profit sharing agreement,' which are securities
within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Securities Act of 1933."100
The SEC apparently reasoned that the "solely from the efforts of
others" test should not be strictly construed, but rather that nominal
promotional activities on the part of the investor should not negative
the existence of an investment contract. Indeed, the SEC went so far
as to state:
The existence of a security must depend in significant measure upon
the degree of managerial authority over the investor's funds retained
or given; and performance by an investor of duties related to the
enterprise, even if financially significant and plainly contributing to
the success of the venture, may be irrelevant to the existence of a
security if the investor does not control the use of his funds to a
significant degree. The "efforts of others" referred to in Howey are
limited, therefore, to those types of essential managerial efforts but
for which the anticipated return could not be produced. 107
Two federal circuit courts have recently supported the SEC's
interpretation. In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,108 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's ruling that Dare to be Great,
Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
should be enjoined from further violating the federal securities laws.
Dare purportedy offered five distinct courses "all aimed at improving
self-motivation and sales ability." Each of the courses required an
increasingly large financial investment, for which the purchaser re-
ceived an increasingly large amount of material on salesmanship. The
court found as a matter of fact that the seminars, films and records
comprising each course were actually designed to induce other in-
105. See SEC Release, supra note 1.
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at 2.
108. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'g 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972).
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dividuals to join Dare. "Their value for any other purpose, [was],
to put it mildly, minimal."'1 9 Only three of the courses, Adventure
III, Adventure IV, and the $1,000 plan, however, permitted the par-
ticipant to recoup his required investment through the recruitment
of others on a commission basis. These three plans were held by the
court to be investment contracts.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that a purchaser of Adventure III,
IV, or the $1,000 plan had to "himself exert some efforts" in order
to "realize a return on his initial cash outlay.""10 At a minimum an
investor was required to solicit individuals to attend a Dare meeting.
The promoters of Dare then had to convince some of these individuals
to enroll in an "Adventure" in order for the original soliciting par-
ticipant to realize a gain from commissions. Therefore, the realiza-
tion of commission gain by a participant would not be the result of
"solely" the efforts of others, but would require the participant's
initial recruitment activities. The court indicated that the word
"solely" from the Howey test "should not be read as a strict or literal
limitation on the definition of an investment contract."'" Instead, it
formulated "a more realistic test, whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts, which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise."" 2 This test is essentially in keeping with the outlook
taken by the SEC in its 1971 press release.
In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,13 the Fifth Circuit held
that a pyramid plan offered by Koscot, another subsidiary of Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., constituted an investment contract.
Koscot managed a multi-level distributorship promotion whose pur-
pose allegedly was to sell cosmetics. However, participants at the top
two levels of this three-tiered system were also entitled to receive siza-
ble commissions for the successful recruitment of additional investors.
The Fifth Circuit, much like the Ninth, noted that whether or
not a participant received commissions was primarily dependent upon
the efforts of the Koscot promoters, and of participants who conducted
meetings in accordance with a detailed script authored by Koscot. Cir-
109. Id. at 479.
110. Id. at 482.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
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cuit Judge Gewin of the Fifth Circuit agreed with Judge Duniway of
the Ninth Circuit that this critical dependence on the "essential mana-
gerial efforts" of the promoters was sufficient to satisfy a liberal in-
terpretation of the "solely from the efforts of others" test promul-
gated in Howey. Hence, Koscot was deemed to be selling "invest-
ment contracts" as that term is used in the two federal securities acts.
At least two other circuits have endorsed the flexible interpreta-
tion given to the world "solely" by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. The
Third Circuit in Lino v. City Investing Co.14 cited the holding in
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., the Securities Act press
release, and the ruling in a Hawaii Supreme Court case'15 as per-
suasive authority. The Third Circuit indicated that the line of reason-
ing employed by these three sources compelled it "to hold that an
investment contract can exist where the investor is required to per-
form some duties, as long as they are nominal or limited and would
have 'little direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the bene-
fits promised by the promoters.' "116 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in
Nash & Associates, Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc.117 referred to the Turner
case, the SEC release, and a number of state court cases in advocating
a "less restrictive approach" toward the definitional difficulties in-
herent in the Howey test." 8 This circuit, however, did not feel com-
pelled by the facts of the case to engage in a detailed application of
the "less restrictive" theory.
A New York lower court case which also adopted the application
of federal securities laws to pyramid schemes is Mahoney v. Andre-
sen." 9 Plaintiff had invested $5,000 in Dare to be Great, Inc., ap-
parently in return for the materials and privileges concurrent with
Adventure IV of the promotion. The court noted that the federal dis-
trict court of Oregon in Turner 20 had previously dictated that Dare's
plan involved the offering of "an investment contract or a participa-
tion in a profit sharing agreement which are securities within the
114. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
115. State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971). Ac-
cording to the Third Circuit in Lino, the Hawaiian supreme court "emphasized that
an investment contract exists where the investor does not have to make significant
efforts in the operation of a franchise." 487 F.2d at 692.
116. 487 F.2d at 692 (citation omitted).
117. 484F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973).
118. Id. at 395.
119. 72 Misc. 2d 1054, 340 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
120. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972).
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meaning of Section 2(1) and Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933."121
The New York court reasoned that since the contracts being offered
by Dare were not registered and were not exempt from registration
under the Securities Act of 1933, they were "void as a matter of
law." 122 Plaintiff recovered his $5,000 plus interest, costs and dis-
bursements. It may not have been possible to bring this rescission
action under New York's Martin Act because of the absence of con-
sistent judicial recognition of a private action under the Act.
The agreement of four federal circuits on the applicability of
federal securities regulations to pyramid sales schemes bodes well for
the unsuspecting consumer-the common prey of such schemes. The
Mahoney case is an example of how state courts may now be more
willing to find fault with pyramid plans for not having registered
with the SEC. Just what additional protection the federal securities
acts afford the consumer requires further delineation.
B. The Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
Anyone attempting to market a securities offering, unless sub-
ject to an exemption, must thoroughly prepare the twin disclosure
statements required by the Securities Act of 1933: the registration
statement, andthe prospectus. The lengthy, required contents of the
registration statement are detailed in section 77aa (Schedule A) 123 of
the Act and include: the names and addresses of the principals of the
issuer,124 the general character of the business actually transacted or to
be transacted by the issuer,25 the price at which it is proposed that
the security shall be offered to the public, 2 6 a balance sheet of the
issuer, 27 and a profit and loss statement.'2 A registration statement
becomes effective 20 days after it has been filed with the Commis-
sion. 29
If a registration statement is not in effect as to a given security,
then it is unlawful for any person to make use of any means or in-
121. 72 Misc. 2d at 1057, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
122. Id. at 1057, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970).
124. Id. § 77aa(4).
125. Id. § 77aa(8).
126. Id. § 77aa(16).
127. Id. § 77aa(25).
128. Id. § 77aa (26).
129. Id. § 77h(a).
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struments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce,
including the mails, to offer to sell, to sell or to deliver such security. 3
This provision is of particular importance because "[i]f it appears to the
Commission that a registration statement is on its fact incomplete or
inaccurate in any material respect, the Commission may, after no-
tice . . . and an opportunity for a hearing," suspend the effectiveness
of the registration statement.' 3 ' Similarly,
if it appears to the Commission at any time that the registration
statement includes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits
to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading, the Commission may,
after notice ... and after opportunity for a hearing ... issue a stop
order suspending the effectiveness of the registration statement.132
In other words, without approval by the Commission of the contents
of a registration statement for a given security, it is illegal to engage
in any transaction associated with that security.
The required contents of the prospectus are identical to those of
the registration statement except that the prospectus need not contain
the last five paragraphs detailed in Schedule A.133 It is unlawful for a
person to use the mails or interstate commerce to carry a prospectus
which fails to meet the requirements of section 77j.134 More im-
portantly, it is ililegal for any person to employ the mails or inter-
state commerce to sell a security unless the sale is accompanied or
preceded by the delivery of a valid prospectus.'35 The Commission has
th authority to suspend the use of a prospectus if it contains any false
or misleading statements. 36
The Securities Act of 1933, unlike the Martin Act, specifically
outlines what civil liabilities are entailed by a violation of the Act.
If a registration statement for a security is false or misleading, any
person obtaining the security may sue every person who signed the
registration statement,137 every person who is or is about to become a
130. Id. § 77e(a) (1), (2).
131. Id. § 77h(b).
132. Id. § 77h(d).
133. Id. § 77j(a) (1).
134. Id. § 77e(b)(1).
135. Id. § 77e(b) (2).
136. Id. § 77j(b).
137. Id. § 77k(a) (1).
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principal of the issuing corporation,138 and virtually every individual
who helped prepare the statement.' 39 Such an action is conditioned
on the person who acquired the security proving that he relied on the
false or misleading element of the statement. A defendant is entitled
to the defense that the person who acquired the security knew at the
time of acquisition of the false or misleading character of the regis-
tration form.
A person who offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e
is also liable to the individual purchasing the security from him.140
Moreover, a person who offers or sells a security by means of a pro-
spectus or oral communication which is false or misleading is liable
to the party buying the security from him.141 As a defense under this
subsection, a defendant may assert that the purchaser knew of the
untrue or misleading nature of the prospectus or oral'communication
at the time of purchase. Additionally, a defendant may avoid liability
by proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the false or misleading character of
the prospectus or oral communication. 42
Under the civil liability sections for both a false or misleading
prospectus and a false or misleading registration statement, controlling
persons (that is, persons who have effective control of the activities
of the actual selling ageint) may also be held jointly and severally
liable. 143 A successful action brought under either of the civil liability
provisions entitles the injured purchaser to rescission or, if the plain-
tiff no longer owns the security, damages. Damages are measured by
"the difference between the purchase price and the plaintiff's resale
price, plus interest, and less any income or return of capital received
on the security by the plaintiff."'144
The Act contains two final remedial provisions. First, "[w]hen-
ever it appears to the Commission that any person is engaged or about
to engage in acts or practices which constitute . . . a violation . . .
it may in its discretion, bring an action in any federal court to enjoin
138. Id. § 77k(a) (2), (3).
139. Id. § 77k(a)(4).
140. Id. § 771(1). See text accompanying notes 130, 134-35 supra.
141. Id. § 771(2).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 77o.
144. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1721 (2d ed. 1961).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
such acts or practices . . .. 145 Second, any person convicted of a will-
ful violation of any of the provisions of the Act is subject to a fine of
not more than $5,000, imprisonment for not more than five years, or
both.146 Some federal circuits have held that the term "willful" simply
means "intentional," while other circuits have indicated that a "will-
ful violation" is one executed with an "evil motive or purpose. '"147
C. An Analysis of the 1933 Act
The inordinately detailed requirements of the registration state-
ment provide the Securities and Exchange Commission with more
than sufficient information to determine the genuineness of a securi-
ties offering. Moreover, if the Commission is dissatisfied with the ac-
curacy or truthfulness of the data disclosed it can suspend the regis-
tration and request additional information. This screening for truth
and accuracy by the Commission is in contrast to the attorney-gen-
eral's ministerial activities under the Martin Act, where properly
filled out forms are accepted regardless of their veracity. Similarly,
the prospectus provides the curious consumer with sufficient facts
from which to derive a realistic appraisal of the worth of the business
opportunity being offered. Here again, the Commission can temporarily
terminate the effectiveness of a prospectus if it is unhappy with the
quality or quantity of disclosure provided by the issuer. In the con-
text of a pyramid plan, then, the tandem disclosure provisions of the
Securities Act can, through the completeness of the data required, pro-
vide the government and consumers with an opportunity to realistically
evaluate the scheme if it chooses to register. Most schemes, however,
will hesitate before registering with the SEC. Because of this fact, the
ability of the Commission to detect schemes at the local level becomes
the crucial deciding factor as to whether pyramid promotions can be
regulated successfully. Once a scheme is detected, liability is almost
automatic, since pyramid schemes will invariably be found to be of-
fering securities without having first submitted a registration state-
ment or prospectus to the Commission (assuming the courts are will-
ing to concede that a pyramid dealership constitutes a security).
Similarly, consumers must be made aware that a pyramid sales plan
145. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
146. Id. § 77x.
147. E.g., United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 331 (2d Cir. 1964).
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probably constitutes a securities offering so that they can take ad-
vantage of the remedies provided by the Act.
A defrauded consumer, of course, will be interested primarily
in the civil liability sections of the Act. Under these provisions, the
injured purchaser may sue both the individual who sold him the
dealership and the controlling founders of the scheme. One draw-
back, however, is that the plaintiff must prove, for jurisdictional pur-
poses, that at some point during the process of consummating the
sale, the postal service or interstate commerce was used. This use
"need not be central to the fraudulent scheme and may be entirely
incidental to it."'1 Nonetheless, as pyramid schemes become increas-
ingly aware of the potentiality of prosecution under the Securities
Act, they may consciously make an effort to avoid use of the mails or
interstate commerce in furtherance of their goals. Such a state of af-
fairs would severely restrict the ability of defrauded purchasers to re-
cover their investment through a civil suit grounded upon one of the
civil liability sections of the Act.
The virtually unlimited potential of the Securities Act as a means
of combatting pyramid plans can only be exploited if the Commis-
sion becomes sensitive to questionable local ventures and if con-
sumers become aware of the Act as a piece of legislation ready-made
to regulate such ventures. One item of federal securities regulation
which has gained increased public prominence is rule lOb-5 49 formu-
lated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This sweeping rule
will constitute the final subject of analysis by this article.
D. Rule 10b-5
Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading or
148. United States v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1960).
149. 17 O.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1974).
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."'5
The rule's applicability to pyramid sales schemes has already been
established in the aforementioned case of SEC v. Koscot Interplane-
tary, Inc.151 In that case the Commission successfully claimed that
Koscot had violated section ten 52 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and rule 1Ob-5. It is well settled that a private remedy is avail-
able under the rule. A careful dissection of the components of the
rule should reveal what a plaintiff has to prove in order to bring a
profitable claim under it.
The initial burden of proving that the guilty party somehow
used the mails or interstate commerce in furtherance of the scheme
is not an onerous one for plaintiff. Since the word "'instrumentality'
is modified by the phrase 'of interstate commerce' [rather than] 'in
interstate commerce' [which appears in many sections of the 1933
Act], . . . intrastate telephone calls are sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion." I5 3 Moreover,
it is well settled that the fraud itself need not be transmitted through
the jurisdictional means. All that is necessary is that the designated
means be used in some phase of the transaction, which need not be
the part in which the fraud occurs. 154
It is reasonable to argue that during the course of completing the sale
of a dealership in a pyramid operation, it is likely the parties in-
volved would at some point have cause to use the telephone. Such an
isolated use is apparently all that is necessary to subject the sale of
the dealership to the scrutiny of lOb-5.
Once having overcome the jurisdictional limitation, plaintiff in
a private action for damages "must prove the following elements: (1)
misrepresentations, omissions, or the employment of some deceptive
150. Id.
151. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). The rule is applicable, of course, only if
pyramid plans are held to be "securities."
152. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
153. Heymen v. Heymen, 356 F. Supp. 958, 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). For an argu-
ment that the phrase "in interstate commerce" used throughout the 1933 Act should be
subject to the same liberal interpretation to which the phrase "of interstate commerce"
is subject, see Ingraffia v. Belle Meade Hosp., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La.
1970).
154. Heymen v. Heymen, 356 F. Supp. 958, 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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scheme; (2) materiality; (3) scienter; and (4) reliance."'15 5 The first
element is relatively self-explanatory. Plaintiff must demonstrate that
a false, deceptive, or misleading representation was made to him in
connection with the sale of the security. The classic formulation of
the materiality requirement is found in List v. Fashion Park, Inc. 56
In that case the court pointed out that the "basic test of 'material-
ity' . . . is whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance [to
the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question."'15' Therefore, plaintiff must prove not only
that he acted upon the misrepresentation, but that a "reasonable
man" would have done so. The scienter component was firmly estab-
lished, at least for the Second Circuit, in Shemtob v. Shearson, Ham
mill & Co. 58 There the court emphasized that no violation of rule
lOb-5 occurs
in the absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to
defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device,
scheme or artifice to defraud. It is insufficient to allege mere negli-
gence. 59
The fourth and final element, that of reliance, simply necessitates
that plaintiff illustrate how he acted upon the misrepresbntation to
his detriment.
In an SEC enforcement proceeding for injunctive relief, the Com-
mission's burden is significantly less severe than that imposed upon
an individual plaintiff seeking damages in a private action. "'[A]n
SEC enforcement proceeding requires only a bare minimum of (1) use
of jurisdictional means, (2) connection with a purchase or sale of a
security, (8) misrepresentation, misleading omission, or other decep-
tion or manipulation and (4) materialty of the misrepresentation or
omission.' ,160 What is needed to establish use of jurisdictional means
has already been discussed. The "in connection with" requirement
simply necessitates that "the device employed, whatever it might be,
be of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon,
155. Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
156. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
157. Id. at 462 (citation omitted).
158. 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
159. Id. at 445.
160. SEC v. Lum's, Inc. 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1060-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citation
omitted).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase ...
a corporation's securities."' 1 In other words, the Commission need
not prove that an actual purchase was made in reliance on the mis-
representation. The Commission need only demonstrate that the
misrepresentation would tend to cause a reasonable investor to rely
on the misinformation in formulating his course of action in the pro-
posed securities transaction. The final two elements of an SEC en-
forcement proceedifig are essentially identical to the initial two com-
ponents of a private cause of action.
In both enforcement proceedings and private actions brought un-
der section l0b and rule lOb-5, controlling persons may also be liable.
Section 20 of the 1934 Act 0 2 provides for the liability of such persons,
although this liability is not absolute. Rather, "at least negligent
conduct [is] required before the imposition of liability."'' 1 Plaintiff's
remedies in a private action under 1Ob-5 are either rescission or dam-
ages.
E. The Usefulness of Rule 10b-5
Once having discovered the promotion of a pyramid enterprise
and its inherently deceptive nature, the Commission should have
little trouble in preventing that scheme from further proliferation by
bringing an injunctive action under lOb-5. However, the commission
has not yet demonstrated its ability to consistently make such local-level
discoveries. Moreover, enjoining the pyramid operation is only half
the battle. There must be some means for returning fraudulently ob-
tained investments to bilked consumers. An injured consumer can
bring a private action for damages under lOb-5, but his burden of
proof is significantly greater than that of the Commission in its pro-
phylactic action. A profitable private action requires, at least in the
Second Circuit, proof of scienter. Demonstrating the intentions of a
defendant is rarely an easy task. Use of section l0b and rule 1Ob-5,
then, as a means of regulating pyramid operations faces the twofold
problem of first making the Commission aware of such operations
and, second, of returning ill-begotten profits to the naive consumer.
If one is to glean anything from an examination of the numerous
161. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
163. SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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and pervasive federal securities regulations, it is that there exists
ample tools for both the government and consumers to do battle
with pyramid schemes. 164 Unfortunately, the Commission cannot ef-
fectively utilize the securities regulations unless it is made aware of
the existence of pyramid plans. Such ubiquitous awareness requires the
expenditure of funds and manpower which the Commission does not
possess and is not likely to possess in the near future, Moreover, the
Commission does not have the facilities to prosecute every violation of
164. In fact, the federal government has a number of additional statutory alterna-
tives at its disposal. The federal mail fraud statutes have been used extensively to
regulate "referral selling plans" which are very similar in nature to pyramid schemes.
For a description of a referral plan, see Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 668-71
(5th Cir. 1967). 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) has been held to have been violated
by a variety of referral operations. See United States v. Ammons, 464 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.
1972) (referral plan for the sale of central vacuum cleaner systems); United States
v. Armantrout, 411 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1969) (referral plan for the sale of carpets);
Nickles v. United States, 381 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1967) (referral plan for the sale
of television sets); Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967) (referral
plan for the sale of water softeners); (Fabian v. United States, 358 F.2d 187 (8th Cir.
1966) (referral plan for the sale of stereo sets). In Zebelman v. United States, 339
F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1964), the mail lottery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), was
employed to squelch a referral plan for the sale of automobiles.
The Federal Trade Commission has also been active in attempting to eradicate
pyramid schemes. In Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc., 3 TnDE REG. REP. 1 20,694 (FTC, July 23,
1974), the Commission stated in an opinion by Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon that
[t]he danger of open-ended, multi-level sales schemes, and their conisderable
potential deceptiveness, lies in the seeming universal feasibility of a money-
making mechanism which is in fact not universally feasible at all. Any plan
which holds out the opportunity to make money, by means of recruiting others,
with that right to recruit being passed on as an inducement for those others
to join, and being passable by them ad infinitum contains this intolerable po-
tential to deceive, quite apart from whatever particular representations may
be made in promoting the plan.
For other FTC actions against pyramid plans, see Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 3 TRADE
RaG. REP. 20,345 (FTC, May 24, 1973) ; Devour Chemical Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
20,129 (FTC, Oct. 2, 1972); International Sales, 3 TRADE RG. RP. No. C-1995
(FTC, Aug. 2, 1971); Bestline Products Corp., 3 TRADE RG. RP. 1 20,350 (FTC,
July 23, 1971); Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 TRADE RG. REP. 1 20,372 (FTC, Jan. 18,
1971); Chemical Associates, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,412 (FTC, Nov. 27, 1970).
For some pointed criticism of the procedures and capabilities of the FTC, see ABA,
REPORT OF THE ABA CoMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMasISSION (1969);
E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969); S. WAGNER, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION (1971).
Finally, Senators John Tower and Walter Mondale have tried unsuccessfully to
induce Congress to enact legislation designed specifically to prohibit pyramid sales
schemes. Senator Tower's bill would have extended the definition of "security" in the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(i) (1970), to include pyramid plans. This
bill, S. 3983, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), died in committee. Senator Mondale's bill
entitled the "Pyramid Sales Act," S. 1939, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), which was
specifically worded to prohibit pyramid schemes, suffered a fate similar to that of the
Tower bill.
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the regulations about which it learns. Of course, consumers them-
selves could serve as the grass roots investigators and prosecutors of
pyramid schemes. Most often, however, consumers lack the knowledge,
time and money to successfully pursue a damages action against a
scheme. Indeed, it is safe to say that many attorneys are not even
cognizant of the potential applicability of federal securities laws to
pyramid sales plans. It is hoped that this Comment will, at least, do
some consciousness-raising in that regard.
CONCLUSION
Both the Erie County pyramid sales scheme statute and the New
York State chain distributor scheme statute essentially proscribe busi-
nesses which sell the right to recruit others for the business. Unfortu-
nately, it appears that a genuine pyramid operation can function
without selling that right. The federal securities laws, of course, were
never intended to apply to pyramid plans. As a result, whether or not
a pyramid dealership constitutes an investment contract and hence a
security, is still problematical. It is no coincidence, however, that all
three statutes face critical definitional difficulties in attempting to
circumscribe the activities of pyramid promotions. Trying to describe
that which is chameleon-like in character is a formidable proposition.
However, even a successful isolation of the problem is only a begin-
ning. The issue then becomes what is to be done to solve the prob-
lem. Reliance on individual defrauded consumers to pursue pyramid
schemes is an unrealistic approach. Those consumers who are most
likely to be enticed by such schemes are precisely the same indi-
viduals who have neither the knowledge, nor money to expeditiously
exterminate the schemes. Clearly the initiative must come from the
government. Assuming the definitional problems detailed in this
article can be overcome, then regulatory legislation is in more than
ample supply. Governmental prosecutorial authorities, however, are
confronted by the dilemma that although they have been empowered
to prosecute pyramid plans, they lack the human and financial re-
sources necessary to unleash such power. Should the time come when
such resources are made available, hopefully this Comment will lend
some assistance in determining the most efficacious method of em-
ploying those resources.
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